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Abstract
In June 2019, the Securities & Exchange Commission made
significant changes to the regulation of investment advice, issuing
regulations and new interpretations of the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940. Industry advocates have argued that states lack power to
enact their own regulations on the theory that various federal statutes
and regulations combine to preempt and sharply limit state authority.
This article examines the current state of reforms around the country
and the policy and legal arguments for and against limiting state
efforts to raise the standards for investment advice.
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INTRODUCTION
American retirements are supported by what has been termed a threelegged stool: (i) defined-benefit pensions; (ii) Social Security; and
(iii) personal savings. As employers shifted from defined-benefit plans to
optional defined-contribution plans, more and more Americans lost access
to traditional defined-benefit pensions. 1 Functionally, this has meant that
more Americans must now balance their retirement on two legs—Social
Security and whatever limited savings they have been able to accumulate.
It also means that instead of having American retirement funds pooled
and managed by dedicated professionals, almost all Americans now have
to develop savvy investing or face the consequences. 2
For many, retirement looks bleak; the United States faces a growing
retirement crisis. Each day, approximately, 10,000 Americans turn 65. 3
Many of them will reach 65 without significant savings. One report
clocked the median retirement account savings for persons aged 65 or
older at just $58,035. 4 For those without sufficient savings, the realities can
be grim. One recent report found that as of 2017, about 7.7% of
American seniors were food insecure. 5 The same report also found that
the number of food insecure American seniors has more than doubled
since 2001, a statistic which partially reflects America’s ballooning senior
population. 6
Even though helping Americans save, invest, and prepare for
retirement remains critical to addressing this slow-moving problem, the
United States lacks any broad, coherent regulation for financial and

For a description of this change and its implications, see generally JACOB S.
HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
2 See Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement Savings and
the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 35 (2015) (describing how the
current system forces unsophisticated Americans to make complex financial decisions).
3 D’Vera Cohn & Paul Taylor, Baby Boomers Approach 65 – Glumly, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Dec. 20, 2010), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/12/20/babyboomers-approach-65-glumly/ (“On January 1, 2011, the oldest Baby Boomers will turn
65. Every day for the next 19 years, about 10,000 more will cross that threshold.”).
4VANGUARD, How America Saves 2019 51 (JUNE 11, 2019), https://institutional
.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/HAS2019.pdf.
5 FEEDING AMERICA, The State of Senior Hunger in America in 2017 3 (May 2019),
https://www.feedingamerica.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/The%20State%20of%
20Senior%20Hunger%20in%202017_F2.pdf.
6 Id.
1
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investment advice. 7 Regulatory authority for financial advice has been split
between, various state agencies, different federal regulators, and financial
self-regulatory organizations largely controlled by industry firms.
On the whole, our system poorly serves the American public. The
financial services industry remains inefficient and riddled with entrenched
conflicts of interest. 8 Financial advisers often deliver substandard advice
and skew investment decisions toward financial products paying
commissions and kickbacks to the financial services firms employing the
advisers.
Substandard financial advice drives enormous costs for retirement
savers. According to one relatively recent study from the White House
Council of Economic Advisers, “the aggregate annual cost of conflicted
advice is about $17 billion each year” for retirement savers. 9 Functionally,
bad advice means that retirement savers will run out of money in
retirement years sooner than they would if they had received better advice.
Efforts to meaningfully address conflicted investment advice at the
federal level have largely been unsuccessful. As Part I explains, a series of
federal rulemakings have resulted in little meaningful change and offer
only dim hope for real reform in the near term.
The latest federal rulemaking round generated Regulation Best
Interest and some other new rules and interpretations from the Securities
& Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC’s release anticipated that states
might see the SEC’s tweaks to existing standards as insufficient and noted
that it could not predict whether its new rules would preempt current or
future state attempts to raise standards on their own. It provided no
guidance, only declaring that “the preemptive effect of Regulation Best
Interest on any state law governing the relationship between regulated
entities and their customers would be determined in future judicial
proceedings based on the specific language and effect of that state law.” 10
See Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented Regulation of Investment
Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47, 48 (2014).
8 See Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 184
(2017) (arguing that the current “incentive structures do not merely hurt individual
investors and reward advisors, but in fact, drive the creation of needlessly complex
financial products and retard economic growth”).
9 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT
ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 2 (Feb. 2015).
10 Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-86031, 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (Jun. 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/
2019/34-86031.pdf.
7
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Faced with federal inaction, state legislatures and regulators have
begun to step forward to increase standards. One SEC Commissioner
praised state leadership, noting that states with fiduciary duties deliver
better results for their citizens. 11 Citing recent research, Commissioner
Jackson recognized that states with more meaningful protections deliver
substantially better outcomes for their citizens. 12 He explained that in
states with fiduciary duty protections, “investors saved 51 basis points each
year by getting better advice.” 13 Functionally, investors with the ability to
put $100,000 aside for twenty years would end up with over $50,000 more
than if they had been steered into an investment with higher costs and
fees. 14
Functionally, there are three main ways a state can impose a fiduciary
duty on investment advice in the state: (i) common law judicial decisions;
(ii) state statutes; or (iii) state regulatory action. As to the common law
route, some states already impose fiduciary duties under state common law
through court decisions recognizing that persons providing investment
advice owe a fiduciary duty to their customers. 15 Because nearly all investor
cases now go through arbitration, gradual common law reform remains
unlikely to occur in the near term. 16
The second two options now face some controversy. On the statutory
front, Nevada moved first, amending its laws to impose a fiduciary duty
on broker-dealers and investment advisers. Recently, New Jersey also
moved forward with its state securities regulators launching a rulemaking
11 Robert Jackson, Statement on Final Rules Governing Investment Advice, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/
statement-jackson-060519-iabd.
12 Id.; see also Vivek Bhattacharya, Gaston Illanes, & Manisha Padi, Fiduciary Duty and
the Market for Financial Advice (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
25861, 2019).
13 See Jackson, supra note 11.
14 Id.
15 See Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary Duty and Investment Advice: Will A Uniform
Fiduciary Duty Make A Material Difference?, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 15 (2014) (“Certain states,
such as California, already impose fiduciary duties on Brokers and broadly declare that
they are fiduciaries”).
16 For a description as to how industry-wide arbitration now displaces public courts
and substantially lowers the probability that state courts will impose higher standards, see
Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, 18 NEV. L.J. 427, 433 (2018) (“If allowed
to consider these disputes today, courts might craft different doctrine. For example,
because brokers now regularly portray themselves as trustworthy financial advisers,
courts might craft doctrine to hold brokers accountable for breaches of that trust.”
(citation omitted)).
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initiative designed to improve the quality of financial advice provided to
New Jersey residents. Part I reviews the current state of play for state
fiduciary law.
As explained below, these initiatives now face well-financed challenges
arguing that States lack the power to pass these laws because some federal
law or regulation somehow preempts state authority. Part II of this essay
offers an early look into some of these challenges. Using a request for state
records, I obtained all of the comment letters that had been submitted
either in favor of or against New Jersey’s draft fiduciary regulation. Where
I could, I also gathered publicly available comment letters addressing
Nevada’s draft fiduciary regulations. Reviewing these letters reveals a
coordinated industry effort to push a few common preemption
arguments—including that existing federal law from the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) prohibits states from
increasing the substantive standards applicable to brokerage firms. This
short essay takes a look at this particular argument in context.
I. THE FEDERAL FIDUCIARY FIGHTS
For decades, federal policymakers have wrestled with questions about
how to compensate financial advisers and how to structure incentives for
the distribution of financial products and advice. 17 Often, financial
advisers are simply stockbrokers (“Brokers”) selling products on
commission. Many of the problems in this space flow from the incentives
created by the differential commissions paid to these Brokers. 18 When
Brokers get paid more for steering their customers to one product over
another, they tend to lead their customers to buy the products most
profitable for themselves and their brokerage firms. Disclosure solutions
tend to work poorly in this context. 19
COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON
COMPENSATION PRACTICES 7–8 (1995), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/bkrcomp
.txt (“[P]articular concern is the practice of firms offering higher payouts when [brokers]
sell proprietary mutual funds instead of funds of a similar class managed by outside
investment companies.”).
18 See Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers As Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 447–48
(2010) (discussing how differential commissions can lead brokers to recommend costlier
products to their customers because they make more money for selling them).
19 Id. (“The larger challenge of any disclosure-oriented strategy to manage fiduciary
conflicts is overcoming the sales efforts, whether via the media or-probably more
powerfully-through the interpersonal skills of sales people trained (and highly motivated)
to elicit trusting responses from their customers”).
17

218

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21

Conflicts of interest in the distribution of financial advice and
financial products pose a complex problem. The differential commission
dynamic plainly does not tend to pair customers with the best products
available for them on the open market. 20 Of course, financial advisers do
not work for free and some investors might be better off receiving
conflicted financial advice than no financial advice at all.
Registered Investment Advisers (“Advisers”) also provide advice about
securities. They are registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
Well-settled law establishes that these Advisers already owe a fiduciary duty
to their clients. The scope of that duty and the SEC’s commitment to
protecting it remains uncertain with recent guidance from the SEC
indicating that most Adviser conflicts of interest may be addressed simply
through disclosure. 21
A. Dodd-Frank
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Congress authorized the
SEC to make changes to harmonize standards between Brokers and
Advisers and to “protect consumers from abusive financial services
practices.” 22 The expansive Dodd-Frank statute called on the SEC to to
review and report on the standards of care for broker-dealers and Advisers
giving advice to retail customers. 23 The SEC released the study in 2011—
with its staff recommending that the SEC use authority granted by DoddFrank to impose a fiduciary duty on the brokerage industry. 24 Notably,
Dodd-Frank also limited the SEC’s power by specifying that whatever
standard the SEC imposed, “receipt of compensation based on
commission or fees shall not, in and of itself, be considered a violation of
such standard applied to a broker, dealer, or investment adviser.” 25

Id. at 445 (“We could simply be cynical, of course: pushing excessively costly
investment strategies is profitable for the industry, and it expends political resources to
protect those profits”).
21 Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment
Advisers, Release No. IA-5248, 17 C.F.R. pt. 275 (June 5, 2019).
22 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
23 Id. The commission regulates both Brokers and Advisers.
24 STAFF OF THE SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER DEALERS i
(2011), http:// www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
25 § 913(g)(1), 124 Stat. at 1828–29.
20
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Although the SEC gained its power to regulate at this time, it did not
attempt to make use of it until 2018 when it launched its Regulation Best
Interest rulemaking initiative.
B. Department of Labor
As the SEC dithered over whether to exercise its authority, the
Department of Labor launched an ambitious rulemaking agenda aimed at
improving the quality of advice given to Americans with assets held in
retirement accounts. 26 Using its authority under Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), the Department of Labor proposed to hold
all personalized investment advice affecting assets in retirement accounts
to a high standard. 27
But the rulemaking initiative did not survive intense opposition. After
the election of President Trump, a new Labor Secretary declared his
opposition. 28 Later, the Fifth Circuit eventually struck down the rule down
as an “arbitrary and capricious exercise of administrative power.” 29
C. SEC
Against this backdrop, the SEC established its own rulemaking
initiative in 2018, which eventually culminated with the series of rules and
interpretations presented as raising standards for financial advice.
Although the SEC’s initiative involves four components, this essay only
describes Regulation Best Interest and the duties it created for brokerage
firms. 30

See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule--Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946 (Apr. 10, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509,
2510, 2550), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/04/08/2016-07924/
definition-of-the-term-fiduciary-conflict-of-interest-rule-retirement-investment-advice.
27 Notably, Labor’s rulemaking captured financial advice from insurance agents as
well as securities-licensed financial advisers.
28 Alexander Acosta, Deregulators Must Follow the Law, So Regulators Will Too: As the
Labor Department acts to revise the Fiduciary Rule and others, the process requires patience, WALL ST.
J., May 22, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/deregulators-must-follow-the-law-soregulators-will-too-1495494029.
29 See Chamber of Commerce of United States of Am. v. United States Dep’t of
Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 2018), judgment entered sub nom. Chamber of
Commerce of Am. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, No. 17-10238, 2018 WL 3301737
(5th Cir. June 21, 2018) (vacating Labor’s Fiduciary Rule).
30 Other components include a new interpretation of the duties owed by Advisers,
an expansive interpretation of the exception for brokerage firms under the Advisers Act,
and a new disclosure requirement for Brokers and Advisers.
26
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Promoted as increasing standards for the brokerage industry,
Regulation Best Interest instructs that a Broker must “act in the best
interest of the retail customer at the time the recommendation is made,
without placing the financial or other interest of the [Broker or brokerage
firm] making the recommendation ahead of the interest of the retail
customer.” 31 Curiously, the regulation does not say that a Broker or
brokerage must put a customer’s interest first—rather that it may not put
its interest ahead of the customer. This leaves substantial room for
Brokers and brokerage firms to consider their own interests.
Brokerages may satisfy the regulation by complying with four
obligations: (i) a disclosure obligation; (ii) a care obligation; (iii) a conflict
of interest obligation; and (iv) a compliance obligation. 32 Among other
things, the “disclosure obligation” requires Brokers to inform customers
of “[a]ll material facts relating to conflicts of interest that are associated
with the recommendation.” 33 The care obligation largely enshrines the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (“FINRA”) existing suitability
standards, directing Brokers and brokerage firms to conduct the same sort
of analysis for pairing customers with securities as currently required by
FINRA’s suitability rule and existing guidance. 34 The conflict of interest
and compliance obligations simply require brokerage firms to mitigate,
and in some cases eliminate, conflicts of interest and set up an appropriate
compliance structure. 35
To some extent, the changes have incrementally improved the preexisting regulatory scheme. But brokerage firms remain free to subject
their sales force to conflicts of interest that is likely to skew their
recommendations. Remarking on the changes, a committee of securities
law professors described them as “taking an ambiguous position that may
raise the standard for brokers marginally.” 36
But the new regulation does raise questions about state law. The same
committee explained that Regulation Best Interest came with some risks

17 C.F.R. § 240.15l-1(a)(1).
17 C.F.R. § 240.15l-1.
33 Id. at (a)(2)(i)(B).
34 Id. at (a)(2)(ii).
35 Id. at (a)(2)(iii).
36 Drafting Committee, Statement of Concerned Securities Law Professors Regarding
Investment Advisers and Fiduciary Obligations, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 25, 2019),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/06/25/statement-of-concerned-securitieslaw-professors-regarding-investment-advisers-and-fiduciary-obligations/.
31
32
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that it “may be read to preempt state laws and rules that do clearly impose
a higher fiduciary duty.” 37
D. Department of Labor, Again
With the SEC regulation set to phase in, the Department of Labor has
indicated that it will undertake a new rulemaking initiative with respect to
fiduciary duty. Although the precise scope of it remains unclear, the
informed observers speculate the administration will largely defer to the
SEC’s standard.
II. STATE REGULATION
With federal regulation largely failing to meaningfully increase
standards, state securities regulation has grown in importance. This part
overviews some state common law, statutory, and regulatory
developments.
A. State Common Law
Many states impose fiduciary duties on Brokers through their state
common law. This can happen either as a suite of duties applicable to all
Brokers operating in the state or to Brokers giving advice in particular
circumstances. One leading study found that the law in twenty-three
different states treated Brokers as fiduciaries to some degree. 38
B. The Nevada Statute
As the federal battle played out over whether the Department of
Labor could impose a fiduciary duty through its authority to regulate
retirement accounts, Nevada moved first to pass its own fiduciary statute.
Nevada enacted a fiduciary duty for Brokers by modifying an existing
statute imposing a fiduciary duty on financial planners. 39
Although Nevada has released draft regulations under the statute, it
has not yet promulgated a new draft or given any indication as to when it
will establish final regulations.

Id.
Finke, Michael S. and Langdon, Thomas Patrick, The Impact of the BrokerDealer Fiduciary Standard on Financial Advice (March 9, 2012). Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2019090 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019090.
39 N.R.S. 628A.
37
38
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C. Other Draft Regulations
At present, New Jersey and Massachusetts have also begun to press
forward with rulemaking initiatives to clearly impose fiduciary duties on
Brokers operating within their borders.
III. THE NSMIA PREEMPTION ARGUMENT
Many of the arguments against more deliberate state investor
protection efforts have centered on the preemptive scope of The National
Securities Markets Improvement Act (“NSMIA”). In particular, the
argument tends to rely heavily on a particular section of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). NSMIA added Section 15(i)(1)
to the Exchange Act. When the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (“SIFMA”) cites the provision in correspondence to state
regulators, it provides the following excerpt:
No law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action
of any State or political subdivision thereof shall establish
capital, custody, margin, financial responsibility, making and
keeping records, bonding, or financial or operational reporting
requirements for brokers, dealers, municipal securities dealers,
government securities brokers, or government securities dealers
that differ from, or are in addition to, the requirements in those areas
established under [the Exchange Act]” (emphasis added). 40

For reasons which remain unclear, the SIFMA letter truncates its
quotation to omit the subsection’s final sentence, which provides that
“[t]he Commission shall consult periodically the securities commissions
(or any agency or office performing like functions) of the States
concerning the adequacy of such requirements as established under this
chapter.” 41 This language seemingly contemplates that the SEC may, from
time to time, amend its requirements to ensure that brokerages capture
information necessary for documenting compliance with state laws.
Based on the limited quotation of the Exchange Act section cited
above, the SIFMA Letter argues that Nevada’s draft fiduciary regulations
would be preempted by NSMIA because they would be “state regulations
40 Letter from Kevin M. Carroll, Managing Director & Associate General Counsel,
SIFMA, to Diana Foley, Nevada Secretary of State’s Office, Securities Division (Mar. 1,
2019) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 780(i)(1) (emphasis added by SIFMA)) [hereinafter “SIFMA
Letter”].
41 15 U.S.C. § 780(i)(1) (emphasis added).
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that by their nature require [brokerages] to make and keep new or different
records than those required by federal law and FINRA rules.” 42 Based on
this, SIFMA told Nevada regulators that its draft regulation “would be
unlikely to survive a legal challenge on NSMIA grounds.” 43
Similar arguments have been made in letters to the New Jersey Bureau
of Securities. For example, Morgan Stanley’s letter opposing New Jersey’s
rulemaking effort incorporates arguments made by SIFMA and also claims
that any additional sales-practice regulation “would clearly impose new
recordkeeping obligations upon [brokerages] as they attempt to document
compliance.” 44
A. Preemption & Securities Law
Generally, federal law may preempt state law in a few different ways.
In areas where Congress has authority, it could write laws expressly
preempting and displacing state laws. If Congress has not expressly
preempted state law, it remains possible for federal law to so thoroughly
occupy a field as to leave no real room for state law. 45 Federal law may also
preempt state law if it somehow conflicts with state law. 46
Securities law has historically involved both state and federal law, with
states playing a vital role in securities regulation. 47 Thus, for state securities
laws to be preempted by federal law, there must be some clear,
irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law. In analyzing Supreme
Court precedent on conflict preemption, one scholar explained that
“conflict exists if either (1) compliance with both the state and federal law
SIFMA Letter at 10.
Id.
44 Letter from Anne Tennant, Managing Director, General Counsel of Morgan
Stanley Wealth Management, to Christopher W. Gerold, Bureau Chief, New Jersey Bureau
of Securities, June 13, 2019 (on file with author).
45 See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Com. of Pennsylvania, 250 U.S.
566, 569, 40 S. Ct. 36, 37, 63 L. Ed. 1142 (1919) (“when the United States has exercised
its exclusive powers over interstate commerce so far as to take possession of the field,
the States no more can supplement its requirements than they can annul them”).
46 See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982) (explaining that
preemption may occur if there is “an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state
regulatory schemes”).
47 See Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1107 (4th Cir. 1989)
(“It is well-settled that federal law does not enjoy complete preemptive force in the field
of securities.”); Chanoff v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 857 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (D. Conn. 1994),
aff ’d, 31 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1994), and aff ’d, 33 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is settled, however,
that Congress did not act to occupy the field of securities; rather, the federal law
preserved the states’ broad powers to regulate areas within the field.”).
42
43
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is ‘a physical impossibility’ or (2) state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’” 48
B. NSMIA Preemption
In instances where Congress wanted to preempt state law, NSMIA
explicitly preempted state requirements, predominantly those applicable to
the issuers of national market securities. 49 Although NSMIA expressly
preempted some state laws, it also explicitly preserved state authority “to
investigate and bring enforcement actions with respect to fraud or deceit,
or unlawful conduct by a broker or dealer, in connection with securities or
securities transactions.” 50 This savings clause leaves substantial room for
states to protect their citizens from deceptive conduct.
Consider a California case, People v. Edward D. Jones & Co., for
example. 51 Edward Jones, a brokerage firm, had entered into agreements
where it accepted undisclosed compensation in exchange for giving
preferential marketing to particular mutual fund shares. 52 California sued
on the theory that by failing to disclose the compensation it received,
Edward Jones withheld material facts from its customers about the basis
for its recommendation. 53 Edward Jones argued that because federal
securities law did not mandate the disclosure, California could not treat it
as a material omission. 54 The appellate court rejected Edward Jones’s
argument, finding that California’s suit was the “type of action expressly
permitted by the NSMIA” and that it “cannot be implicitly prohibited”
because it was expressly authorized by the savings clause. 55 The California
court recognized that withholding the information could be fairly
characterized as the sort of fraud or deceit states retained the power to
address.
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 (2000) (citing Supreme
Court precedents).
49 Hazen, § 8:9.State Blue Sky Laws—Partial Federal Preemption of State Securities
Laws by Federal Law, 2 Law Sec. Reg. § 8:9 (explaining that NSMIA preempted much
issuer-focused law including “registration and reporting requirements applicable to
securities transactions”).
50 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (2000).
51 People v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 154 Cal. App. 4th 627 (2007).
52 Id. at 630–31.
53 Id. at 631.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 637–38.
48
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California courts rejected another NSMIA-premised challenge in
Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Brown. 56 That case drew a sensible line by
recognizing that while NSMIA was targeted at state registration
requirements, it also aimed “to encourage the continued participation of
the states in preventing fraud in securities transactions, particularly with
regard to broker-dealers.” 57
These precedents tend to support a continued role for state regulators
in policing brokerage sales practices.
C. NSMIA’s History
NSMIA’s legislative history adds to the inference that it should not be
read to limit state authority to police broker-dealer sales practices. Indeed,
a House committee report made this intention explicit, stating that “The
Committee does not intend . . . [to] limit [states’] ability to investigate,
bring actions, or enforce orders, injunctions, judgments or remedies based
on alleged violation of State laws that prohibit fraud and deceit or that
govern broker-dealer sales practices . . . .” 58
D. Inconsistency with Existing State Securities Statutes
Many of the NSMIA-themed arguments could also be applied to other
widely enacted state securities regulation. For example, the North
American Securities Administrators Association released a model
legislation to protect vulnerable adults from financial exploitation. 59 A
number of states have already adopted the legislation. For example,
Alabama passed the legislation and created a mandatory duty for
brokerage employees to report suspected financial exploitation. 60 Were the
NSMIA-preemption argument to be accepted, it would, by extension,
mean that states could not enact these types of ordinary protective
measures.
E. General Consistency with Regulation Best Interest
Despite the criticisms, most proposed state-level fiduciary initiatives
appear largely consistent with regulation Best Interest. Regulation Best
Capital Research & Mgmt. Co. v. Brown, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 778 (2007).
Id.
58 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 30 (1996) (emphasis added).
59 See NASAA, NASAA Members Adopt Model Act to Protect Seniors and Vulnerable
Adults (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.nasaa.org/38777/nasaa-members-adopt-model-actto-protect-seniors-and-vulnerable-adults/.
60 ALA. CODE §§ 8-6-170–179 (2016).
56
57
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Interest has been criticized for merely seemingly to offer a framework for
addressing and mitigating conflicts of interest, but leaving the scope of
that effort up to brokerage firms. Allowing the content of state law to
shape those compliance and disclosure obligations within Regulation Best
Interest’s framework appears entirely consistent with the SEC’s regulation
and stated investor protection goal.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, arguments that states lack authority to regulate broker
dealer sales practices because of NSMIA’s books and records provision
appear overstated. If Congress had wanted to prohibit states from
regulating broker-dealer sales practices, a books and records provision
would be an odd way to do it.
On balance, a NSMIA preemption argument premised on its books
and records provision appears unlikely to succeed. States retain authority
to regulate sales practices within their borders and a brokerage firm may
comply with state law without violating federal law or frustrating NSMIA’s
core purpose.

